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Analyzing voting on income taxation usually implies mathematically cumbersome models.
Moreover, a majority voting winner does not usually exist in such setups. Therefore, it is important
to mathematically describe those cases in which a majority winner exists, at least for the basic
models of voting on income taxation. We provide a complete mathematical description of those
income distribution functions for which a majority winning tax exists or does not exist, in the
quadratic taxation model a` la Roemer 1999, with tax schedules that are not necessarily purely
redistributive. As an intermediate step, we identify by the corner method what are the most
preferred taxes of the individuals, when taxation is not purely redistributive. Finally, we prove
that for both purely and nonpurely redistributive quadratic taxations, the suﬃcient inequality
condition of De Donder and Hindriks 2004 on the income distribution functions, for the existence
of a Condorcet winner, can be relaxed to a broader condition.
1. Introduction
One important question that the positive theory of income taxation tries to answer is
why marginal-rate progressive tax schedules are preponderant in democracies. An heuristic
argument commonly invoked to explain this stylized fact resides in the observation that
in general, the number of relatively poor self-interest voters exceeds that of richer ones.
Nevertheless, mathematically formalizing the argument is not an easy task and the literature
is rather inconclusive in this respect.
One very important diﬃculty which arises when studying these issues is that usually
the existence of a majority winner i.e., Condorcet winner is not guaranteed. Voting games
over redistributive tax schedules lack in general the existence of a static equilibrium see
Marhuenda and Ortun˜o-Ortin 1, Hindriks 2, De Donder and Hindriks 3. The seminal
papers of Romer 4, 5 and Roberts 6 consider only flat rate taxes in order to make use
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of the median voter theorem, after imposing some natural additional restrictions. However,
the overrestrictive assumption of linear tax schemes does not provide the framework to
investigate important issues like the high prevalence of marginal-rate progressive taxations in
democracies. Therefore, many authors study the basic problem of voting on income taxations
in terms of larger classes of tax functions.
Gouveia and Oliver 7 work with two-bracket piecewise linear functions, Cukierman
and Meltzer 8 and Roemer 9 study quadratic tax functions, while Carbonell and Klor 10
consider a representative democracy model that allows for the class of all piecewise linear tax
schedules. Marhuenda and Ortun˜o-Ortin 11 allow for the class of all concave or convex tax
functions, proving by Jensen’s inequality that for income distributions with the median below
the mean income, any concave tax scheme receives less popular support than any convex tax
scheme.
Carbonell and Ok 12 provide a two-party voting game in which each party whose
objective is to win the elections proposes tax schemes from an unrestricted set of admissible
functions and the voters selfishly vote for the tax that taxes them less. Establishing the
existence of mixed equilibria, they identify certain cases in which marginal-rate progressive
taxes are chosen almost surely by the political parties. However, Carbonell and Ok 12
find that if the tax policy space is not artificially constrained, the support of at least one
equilibrium cannot be obtained within the set of marginal-rate progressive taxes. This result
is in the same line with the one of Klor 13, who shows that a majority of poor voters does
not necessarily imply progressive taxation for a more general policy space than the one in
Marhuenda and Ortun˜o-Ortin 11.
Although it is hard to find an economically meaningful way of restricting the
admissible set of income tax functions, the literature on voting over income taxes which
are chosen from restricted policy spaces provides useful and powerful insights into the
general problem. In particular, the quadratic model was very much used in the literature
to generate interesting results. Cukierman and Meltzer 8 analyze the conditions under
which the median voter’s most preferred tax policy is a majority winner, in quadratic
distortionary tax environments. Roemer 9 uses the quadratic taxation framework to define
a diﬀerent solution concept than the majority winner, based on the need to reach an intraparty
agreement between the “opportunists” and the “militants” of the parties. In the same setup
of fixed income i.e., income not distorted by taxes and quadratic taxations as the one in
Roemer 9, Hindriks 2 establishes the inevitable vote cycling theorem.
De Donder and Hindriks 14 introduce preferences for leisure in the quadratic
taxation model and study the voting process over tax schedules using other political
equilibria than the Condorcet winner. For the quadratic model with fixed income, De Donder
and Hindriks 3 show that incentive constraints result in the policy set to be closed and
that individuals all have corner solutions over this set. They also provide a necessary
and suﬃcient condition on the income distribution such that a Condorcet winner exists.
Moreover, for income distributions with the median less than the mean, if a majority winner
exists then it involves maximum progressivity.
This paper provides a complete description of those income distribution functions for
which a majority winning tax exists or does not exist, when the quadratic taxation model
is not purely redistributive. For reasons of completeness, the analysis is not limited only
to right skewed income distributions which are empirically predominant, but there has
been also considered the case of the left skewed income distributions. We also identify what
are the most preferred taxes of the individuals and the corresponding income groups they
can be classified in, based on the preferred policies, when taxation has more than a purely
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redistributive purpose. Moreover, we show in this paper that the suﬃcient condition of De
Donder and Hindriks 3, imposed on the income distribution functions in order to insure
the existence of a Condorcet winner, can be relaxed to a broader condition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 states and
proves the results. Section 4 discusses and draws the conclusions.
2. The Model
The economy consists of a large number of individuals who diﬀer in their fixed income.
Each individual is characterized by his/her income x ∈ 0, μ. The income distribution can be
described by a continuous function F : 0, μ → 0, 1, diﬀerentiable almost everywhere and
strictly increasing on the interval 0, μ. Each individual with income x ∈ 0, μ has strictly
increasing preferences on the set of its possible net incomes. For any Lebesque measurable
set S ⊆ 0, μ, the associated Lebesque-Stieltjes probability measure induced by F is denoted
by νS and it is defined as νS 
∫
S dFx.
For better comprehensibility of the text, any parameter calculated based on the
distribution F is denoted using the letter y e.g., the mean is y, the median is denoted by ym,
the noncentered moment of second order is y2, and the variance of the income distribution is
σ2  y2 − y2, while x refers to a random income in the interval 0, μ.
The fixed amount 0 ≤ R < y  ∫μ0 xdFx should be collected through means of a
tax imposed on the agents. When R  0, the tax is purely redistributive. It is assumed that
there is no tax evasion, and there are no distortions induced by the taxation system in the
economy i.e., the income is fixed, respectively. The set of admissible tax functions satisfies
certain conditions. For a given F and R ∈ 0, y, TF,R denotes the set of all functions t ∈
C0, μ such that without the second and third conditions below, we would have a resource
redistribution problem like in Grandmont 15, which is known not to have a Condorcet
winner; see at the end of this section the definition for a majority winner.
1 tx ≤ x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ μ;
2 tx ≤ ty, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ μ;
3 x − tx ≤ y − ty, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ μ;
4
∫μ
0 txdFx  R.
A tax schedule is marginally progressive regressive if and only if tx is convex
concave. In the following, we consider only quadratic taxes of the form t : 0, μ → −∞, μ,
tx  ax2 	 bx 	 c. The analysis also includes the case of linear tax schedules, when
the coeﬃcient “a” takes the zero value. We restrict our analysis to QTF,R, the set of
quadratic tax functions that satisfy the feasibility conditions 1–4. It can be easily proved
that conditions 1 to 4 restrict the set of quadratic feasible taxes to functions of the form







0 ≤ b ≤ 1,
0 ≤ 2aμ 	 b ≤ 1,
ay2 	 by ≥ R.
2.1





























Figure 1: Feasibility areas for diﬀerent cases of the collected tax amount R.
Note that for every given distribution F and feasible R, to every tax t from QTF,R, it
corresponds one and only one element a, b in the feasible area FA, and vice versa. Thus,
the set of feasible quadratic tax policies a, b can be illustrated as follows the intervals for






0 xdFx  μy.
i The case 0 ≤ R ≤ y2/2μ is represented in Figure 1a.
ii The case y2/2μ < R < y − y2/2μ is represented in Figure 1b.
iii The case y − y2/2μ ≤ R < y is represented in Figure 1c.
The coordinates of the vertices of the above polygons are easily obtained by
elementary computations and are given by
progressive taxations: A1/2μ, 0, A1R/y2, 0, A2y−R/2μy−y2, 2Rμ−y2/2μy−y2,
regressive taxations: C−1/2μ, 1, C1−R/2μy − y2, 2Rμ/2μy − y2, C2R − y/y2, 1,
no taxation: O0, 0, confiscation policy: B0, 1.
Figure 1 presents the feasibility areas for diﬀerent cases of the collected amount R.
These areas are determined by the FA conditions as follows: the first two conditions
determine the interior and the sides of the OABC parallelogram. The third condition is the
tax revenue requirement constraint, graphically identified by the half-plane situated above
the line A2C2.
For the case depicted in Figure 1a, the tax A is the most progressive, C is the most
regressive, and A2 and C2 are out of the feasible area FA. If R > 0 then O is not feasible,
while if R  0 then A1  C1  O. For the case depicted in Figure 1b, the tax policy A2 is the
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Table 1: The behavior of x1α and x2α.
α −∞ 0 y2/2y2 μ2 − y2/2yμ − y μ/y ∞
x1α −∞ ↗ ↗ ↗ 0 ↗ μy − y2/μ − y ↗ y1 ↗ y
x2α y ↗ y2 ↗ y2/y ↗ μ ↗ ↗ ↗ ∞
most progressive, C is the most regressive, and the tax policies O, A, A1, C2 are not feasible.
For the case depicted in Figure 1c, the tax schedule A2 is the most progressive, C2 is the
most regressive, and the tax policies O, A, A1, C1 are not feasible.
A majority or Condorcet winning tax policy is a pair t  a, b in the feasible set such
that is preferred by a majority of individuals to any other feasible pair t  a, b in QTF,R.
An equivalent definition used in our proofs is the following: a tax function is a majority
winner if and only if there is no objection to it given t ∈ QTF,R, a tax policy t ∈ QTF,R
is an objection to t if ν{x ∈ 0, μ : tx < tx} > ν{x ∈ 0, μ : tx > tx}. We denote by
ObjQTF,Rt the set of all objections to the taxation function t. Therefore, the above definitions
for t being a Condorcet winner are equivalent to the condition ObjQTF,Rt  ∅.
If R  0, by considering y1  μ−
√
μ − y2 	 σ2 and y2 
√
y2, De Donder and Hindriks
3 defined the low middle and large income groups which are obtained based on the three
intervals y1 and y2 divide 0, μ. Note as well that y1 < y < y2. Nevertheless, the other
two fixed values of the income are important for the analysis that follows. Those values are
0 < μy − y2/μ − y < y1 < y2 < y2/y < μ. In the same spirit as the interpretation oﬀered by
De Donder and Hindriks 3, the voters x ∈ μy − y2/μ − y, y1 are poor with relatively
high income, and x ∈ y2, y2/y are rich voters with relatively low income, respectively. As
one can see in the section of results, these values will play an important role for stating the
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner in the described
environment.
3. Results
In order to identify the majority winning tax policies if any, the first step is to characterize
the tax policies t that are objections to a given tax policy t. Therefore, we need first to
determine the sign of the function t − t on the interval 0, μ and then to find the Lebesgue
measure νS of the set S on which the diﬀerence function is negative. The following lemma
presents the way in which the two roots of the quadratic function t−t vary. Since the diﬀerence
function is t−t : 0, μ → R, t−tx  a−ax2	b−bx−a−ay2−b−by, then it is suﬃcient
to study the sign of the following quadratic function: h : 0, μ → R, hx  ux2	vx−uy2−vy,
u, v ∈ R. We will analyze in the lemma only the case when u/ 0; the case u  0 will be
discussed separately each time when it occurs in our discussion.
Lemma 3.1. Let h : 0, μ → R, hx  ux2 	 vx − uy2 − vy, u ∈ R∗, and v ∈ R, and let
α  −v/2uy. Then, for each α ∈ R, the quadratic function h has two real roots x1α  αy −√
α − 12y2 	 σ2 and x2α  αy 	
√
α − 12y2 	 σ2, which vary as functions of α as it is shown
in Table 1, where y1  μ −
√
μ − y2 	 σ2 and y2 
√
y2.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The discriminant of h can be written as Δ  v 	 2uy2 	 4u2y2 > 0; hence
h has two real roots. For each α  −v/2uy ∈ R, we will denote by x1α and by x2α the
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smallest and, respectively the largest of the roots. After short computations, we get x1α 
αy −
√
α − 12y2 	 σ2 and x2α  αy 	
√
α − 12y2 	 σ2.
The behavior of the roots as functions of α ∈ R can be elementary studied by
computing their derivatives and the limits at the endpoints of R. Since x′1α > 0, for each
α ∈ R and x′2α > 0, for each α ∈ R, then x1α and x2α are increasing functions
of α. The limits of the functions x1 and x2 at the endpoints of the definition domain are
lim α→−∞x1α  −∞, lim α→∞x1α  y, lim α→−∞x2α  y, lim α→∞x2α  	∞.
Elementary computations give us the following results: x1y2/2y
2  0, x1μ2 −
y2/2yμ − y  μy − y2/μ − y, x1μ/y  y1, x20  y2, x2y2/2y2  y2/y, and
x2μ2−y2/2yμ−y  μ. Due to the previous computations, the behavior of the functions
x1 and x2 is as presented in Table 1.
The purely redistributive tax policies that individuals prefer are described in De
Donder and Hindriks 3; all individuals in the same income class prefer the same policy.
The low income group prefers confiscation policy represented by the point B in the feasible
region FA when R  0, the middle income class prefers the maximum progressivity
represented by the point A if R  0, and no taxation the point O is preferred by the
high income group. The next lemma shows how this simple description changes when the
tax schedules are not purely redistributive. A sketch of the proof is provided after stating the
result and further details are available upon request.
Lemma 3.2. The preferred tax for an individual with the income x ∈ 0, μ is
1 the case 0 ≤ R ≤ y2/2μ (Figure 1(a)):
1a B for x ∈ 0, y1 (for the income y1, the individual is indiﬀerent between the taxes on
the segment AB),
1b A for x ∈ y1, y2 (for the income y2, the individual is indiﬀerent between the taxes
on the segment AA1),
1c A1 for x ∈ y2, y2/y (for the income y2/y, the individual is indiﬀerent between the
taxes on the segment A1C1),
1d C1 for x ∈ y2/y, μ,
2 the case y2/2μ < R < y − y2/2μ (Figure 1(b)):
2a B for x ∈ 0, y1 (for the income y1, the individual is indiﬀerent between the taxes on
the segment A2B),
2b A2 for x ∈ y1, y2/y (for the income y2/y, the individual is indiﬀerent between the
taxes on the segment A2C1),
2c similar to (1d),
3 the case y − y2/2μ ≤ R < y (Figure 1(c)):
3a similar to (2a),
3b A2 for x ∈ y1, y2/y (for the income y2/y, the individual is indiﬀerent between the
taxes on the segment A2C2),
3c C2 for x ∈ y2/y, μ.
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Proof of Lemma 3.2. An individual with income x ∈ 0, μ prefers the tax t  a, b ∈ QTF,R
for which the diﬀerence x − tx  ay2 − x2 	 by − x 	 x −R is maximum. Hence, we have
to solve the following linear programming problem: determine the maximum of the function
fa, b  ay2 − x2 	 by − x 	 x − R, subject to the constraints 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 2aμ 	 b ≤ 1,
ay2	by ≥ R, a, b ∈ R. The problem can be elementary solved by using the corner method.
Irrespective of the amount R that should be collected, the low income group prefers
the tax policy that equalizes the posttax income. The middle income group prefers the most
progressive tax policy. The high income group is divided in a lower part and an upper one
by the value y2/y. The upper part always prefers a regressive taxation when R > 0 in fact,
for high values of the amount to be collected, this income group prefers the most regressive
tax schedule—see Lemma 3.23c above. The lower part of the high income group usually
behaves as the middle income group, except for the case of low levels of R. Even in such a case
see Lemma 3.21c, the lower part of the high income group prefers a progressive taxation
instead of a regressive one. These observations motivate a possible redefinition of the middle
income group from y1 to y2/y. However, in order to have clear comparisons between the
results in De Donder and Hindriks 3 and our results, we consider y2, y2/y as the lower
part of the high income group, while the interval y1, y2 keeps its interpretation of middle
income class.
Having Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 at hand, we are in the position to provide a complete
description of the cases in which there is a majority winning tax, or when there is not. The
next proposition can be immediately obtained from the lemmas and it is a first step to provide
such a description.
Proposition 3.3. The following assertions hold.
1 If ym ≤ y1, then for each 0 ≤ R < y the tax policy B is a majority winner (a Condorcet
winner).
2 If ym ≥ y2/y, then for each 0 ≤ R < y the tax policy C1 is a majority winner (a Condorcet
winner).
3 If y2 ≤ ym ≤ y2/y andR  0, then the tax policyO0, 0 is a majority winner (a Condorcet
winner).
Proof of Proposition 3.3. 1 Let t ∈ QTF,R be defined by tx  x 	 R − y. In order to prove
that under the conditions imposed by the hypothesis the function t is a majority winner,
it is suﬃcient to show there is no objection to it. Suppose by contrary that there exists t ∈
ObjQTF,Rt. Then t : 0, μ → −∞, μ, t  ax2 	 bx 	 R − ay2 − by satisfies the feasibility
conditions FA.
Figure 2 presents the feasibility areas for the coeﬃcients u and v of the functions t − t,
which occur in the proofs of the Propositions 3.3 and 3.4. The feasibility areas are determined
in a similar way as for the a, b-feasible taxes: a parallelogram is separated by the line
generated by the budget constraint condition.
We denote by h : 0, μ → R, hx  t − tx  ux2 	 vx − uy2 − vy, where by u and
v we mean a and b − 1, respectively. From the feasibility conditions FA for the tax function
t, we obtain that the coeﬃcients u and v must satisfy −1 ≤ v ≤ 0, −1 ≤ 2uμ 	 v ≤ 0, and
uy2 	 vy ≥ R − y. The feasible area for the coeﬃcients u and v can be represented as it is
shown in the Figure 2a.

























































1 − y2 − 2Rμ
y2 − 2yμ
f
Figure 2: Feasibility areas for the coeﬃcients u and v.
If u  0, then v ∈ −1	R/y, 0 and ν{x : hx < 0}  νy, μ  ∫μ
y
dFx  1−Fy < 1/2
since 1/2  Fym ≤ Fy1 < Fy.
If u < 0 and v ≤ 0, then α  −v/2μy ∈ −∞, 0 and the roots of h satisfy the
inequalities x1α < 0 and x2α ∈ y, y2 see Lemma 3.1. In this case ν{x ∈ 0, μ : hx <
0}  νx2α, μ  1 − Fx2α ≤ 1 − Fy < 1/2 see Table 2, line 2.
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Table 2: The sign of the function h  t − t.
1 x 0 μy − y2/μ − y y1 y y2 y2/y μ
2 hx 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0 − − − − −
3 hx 	 	 	 	 	 0 − − − − − − −
4 hx − − − − − − − − − 0 	 	 	
5 hx − − − − − 0 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
6 hx − − − − − − − 0 	 	 	 	 	
7 hx 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0 − − −
8 hx − 0 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0 −
9 hx − − − 0 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
If u > 0 and v ≤ 0, then α  −v/2uy ∈ μ/y,∞ and the roots of h satisfy the
inequalities x1α ∈ y1, y and x2α > μ see Lemma 3.1. In this case ν{x : hx < 0} 
νx1α, μ  1 − Fx1α ≤ 1 − Fy1 ≤ 1/2 see Table 2, line 3.
So, for any pair u, v which satisfy the feasibility conditions, the function t cannot be
an objection to the tax function t and the tax function tx  x 	 R − y is a majority winner.
2 We will prove that there is no objection to the tax policy t given by C1. Suppose,
by contrary that there exists t ∈ ObjQTF,Rt. Let t be the tax policy given by a, b and let
h  t − t, h : 0, μ → R, hx  t − tx  ux2 	 vx − uy2 − vy where by u and v we
mean a 	 R/2μy − y2 and b − 2Rμ/2μy − y2, respectively. The feasibility conditions for
t conduct to the following conditions on the coeﬃcients u and v: −Rμ/2μy − y2 ≤ v ≤
1 −Rμ/2μy − y2, 0 ≤ 2μu 	 v ≤ 1, uy2 	 vy ≥ 0. The feasible area for the coeﬃcients u and v
can be represented as it is shown in the Figure 2b.
If u  0, then v > 0 and ν{x : hx < 0}  ν0, y  Fy ≤ Fym  1/2.
If u > 0, then α  −v/2uy ∈ −∞, y2/2y2 and the roots of h satisfy the inequalities
x1α ≤ 0 and x2α ∈ y, y2/y. In this case ν{x : hx < 0}  ν0, x2α  Fx2α ≤
Fym  1/2 see Table 2, line 4.
If u < 0 then α  −v/2uy ∈ μ/y,∞ and the roots of h satisfy the inequalities x1α ∈
y1, y and x2α > μ. In this case ν{x : hx < 0}  ν0, x1α  Fx1α ≤ Fym  1/2 see
Table 2, line 5.
So, for any pair u, v which belongs to the feasible area, the function t  h 	 t cannot
be an objection to the tax function t and the tax policy C1 is a Condorcet winner.
3 We will prove that in this case there is no objection to the tax policy t given by
O0, 0. Suppose by contrary that there exists t ∈ ObjQTF,Rt. Let t be the tax policy given by
a, b. The feasibility area for the coeﬃcients u  a and v  b is presented in Figure 2c.
If u  0, then v > 0 and ν{x ∈ 0, μ : hx < 0}  ν0, y  Fy ≤ Fym  1/2.
If u > 0, then α  −v/2uy ∈ −∞, 0, x1α ≤ 0, x2α ∈ y, y2 and ν{x : hx < 0} 
ν0, x2α  Fx2α ≤ 1/2 see Table 2, line 6.
If u < 0, then α  −v/2uy ∈ μ/y,∞, x1α ∈ y1, y, x2α > μ and ν{x : hx <
0}  ν0, x1α  Fx1α ≤ Fy ≤ 1/2 see Table 2, line 5.
In conclusion for any u and v such that the pair u, v belongs to the feasible area, the
function t is not an objection to the tax function t. This completes the proof.
Note that if R  0, the result from Proposition 3.31 was first obtained by De Donder
and Hindriks 3 see Proposition 1a in that paper. Proposition 3.31 is a generalization: it
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states that for every feasible value of R, if a majority of individuals is in the low income group,
then the voting outcome will determine that all individuals are equal in the posttax income.
The second and third parts of the proposition have no empirical relevance since there is
overwhelming evidence ruling out negatively skewed income distributions. However, these
parts are reported for the purpose of completeness, such that Proposition 3.3 and the next
three form together a knit result. In fact, the results from the last two parts of Proposition 3.3
are very logical; e.g., the second part states that an existing majority of individuals in the
upper part of the high income class will induce as a voting outcome the regressive tax system
preferred by all the individuals with income in that subclass.
The next two propositions are central for the current paper. We start with the second
proposition, that provides a necessary condition for a majority winning tax to exist.
Proposition 3.4. Let F be such that Fy2/y − Fμy − y2/μ − y ≥ 1/2.
1 If y1 < ym < y2, then for each 0 ≤ R ≤ y2/2μ the tax policy A is a majority winner (a
Condorcet winner).
2 If y2 ≤ ym < y2/y, then for each 0 < R ≤ y2/2μ the tax policy A1 is a majority winner
(a Condorcet winner).
3 If y1 < ym < y2/y, then for each y2/2μ ≤ R < y the tax policy A2 is a majority winner
(a Condorcet winner).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. 1 We have to prove that there is no objection to the tax policy t given
by A. Let t ∈ ObjQTF,Rt be a tax policy given by a, b and let h  t − t, h : 0, μ → R,
hx  t−tx  ux2	vx−uy2−vy, where u  a−1/2μ and v  b. The feasibility conditions
for t determine the following inequalities: 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, −1 ≤ 2μu 	 v ≤ 0, and uy2 	 vy ≥
R − y2/2μ. The feasible area for the coeﬃcients u and v can be represented as it is shown in
the Figure 2d.
If u  0, then v  0 and t  t, which is not an objection to the tax function t.
If u < 0, then α  −v/2uy ∈ 0, μ/y. If α ∈ 0, y2/2y2, then x1α ≤ 0, x2α ∈
y2, y2/y and ν{x : hx < 0}  νx2α, μ  1 − Fx2α < 1 − 1/2  1/2 see Table 2,
line 7. If α ∈ y2/2y2, μ2 − y2/2yμ − y, then x1α ∈ 0, μy − y2/μ − y, x2α ∈
y2/y, μ and ν{x : hx < 0}  ν0, x1α 	 νx2α, μ  Fx1α 	 Fμ − Fx2α 
1 − Fx2α − Fx1α ≤ 1 − Fy2/y − Fμy − y2/μ − y ≤ 1 − 1/2  1/2 see Table 2,
line 8. If α ∈ μ2 − y2/2yμ − y, μ/y, then x1α ∈ μy − y2/μ − y, y1, x2 ≥ μ and
ν{x : hx < 0}  ν0, x1α  Fx1α ≤ Fym < 1/2 see Table 2, line 9.
In conclusion, for any pair u, v which belongs to the feasible area, the function t
cannot be an objection to the tax function t. Hence, the tax policy given by A is a Condorcet
winner.
2 We have to prove that there is no objection to the tax policy given by A1. Let t ∈
ObjQTF,Rt be a tax policy given by a, b, and let h  t − t, h : 0, μ → R, hx  ux2 	
vx − uy2 − vy, where u  a − R/y2 and v  b. The feasibility conditions for t determine the
following inequalities: 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, −2Rμ/y2 ≤ 2μu 	 v ≤ 1 − 2Rμ/y2, and uy2 	 vy ≥ 0. The
feasible area for the coeﬃcients u and v can be represented as it is shown in Figure 2e.
If u  0, then v ≥ 0 and ν{x : hx < 0}  ν0, y  Fy ≤ Fym  1/2.
If u > 0, then α  −v/2uy ∈ −∞, 0 and the proof is similar to the correspondent
case of the 1st part.
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If u < 0, then α ∈ y2/2y2,∞, and after splitting in subcases α ∈ y2/2y2, μ2 −
y2/2y
2, α ∈  μ2 − y2/2y2, μ/y, and α ∈ μ/y,∞ the proofs are similar to the
correspondent cases of the 1st part.
Hence, the tax policy A1 is a majority winner.
3 We have to prove that there is no objection to the tax policy t given by A2. If t is
given by a, b and u  a − R − y/y2 − 2μy and v  b − y2 − 2Rμ/y2 − 2μy, then the
feasibility area for u, v is given by the conditions: −y2 − 2Rμ/y2 − 2μy ≤ v ≤ 1 − y2 −
2Rμ/y2 − 2μy, −1 ≤ 2uμ 	 v ≤ 0, and uy2 	 vy ≥ 0. The feasible area for the coeﬃcients u
and v can be represented as it is shown in the Figure 2f.
In this case α ∈ y2/2y2, μ/y and u < 0. After splitting in subcases α ∈ y2/2y2,
μ2 − y2/2yμ − y and α ∈ μ2 − y2/2yμ − y, μ/y, then the proofs are similar to the
correspondent parts of the 1st case.
Hence, the tax policy A2 is a majority winner. This completes the proof.
If R  0, the result from Proposition 3.41 was first established by De Donder and
Hindriks 3 see Proposition 1b in that paper. However, their result was obtained by
imposing the more restrictive condition Fy2 − Fy1 ≥ 1/2. In other words, for every
distribution function F such that Fy2/y − Fμy − y2/μ − y ≥ 1/2 > Fy2 − Fy1,
we have with certainty that the maximum progressivity tax is the voting outcome, as far as
the median voter prefers this policy. This result does not depend on whether the tax is purely
redistributive or not. For purely redistributive taxes, a specific proof is provided in Curt, Litan
and Filip 16.
Therefore, it is enough to have a majority formed by individuals between the upper
part of the low income group and the lower part of the high income group, in order to
obtain support for the highest tax progressivity. Our next example proves that the necessary
condition in Proposition 1b in De Donder and Hindriks 3 is overrestrictive. We construct
a function F with Fy2/y − Fμy − y2/μ − y > 1/2 > Fy2 − Fy1, in which case the
conclusions of our Proposition 3.4 trivially apply.




















































































The mean income y  89/200μ, greater than the median income ym which is equal to
1/2−1/70
√
4877/221μ ≈ 0.4328μ. Routine calculations show that y1  2/5μ, y2  1/2μ,
y2/y  50/89μ, μy−y2/μ−y  13/37μ, Fy2/y−Fμy−y2/μ−y  F50/89μ−
F13/37μ ≈ 0.5379 > 1/2, Fy2 − Fy1  F1/2μ − F2/5μ  49/100 < 1/2 and
y1 < ym < y2.
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For this income distribution, our Proposition 3.4 directly applies while there is no
need to check the necessary and suﬃcient condition of Proposition 3 in De Donder and
Hindriks 3.
The first and third parts of the Proposition 3.4 advocate the idea that the majority
winning tax is the most progressive one, when the median voter is part of the middle income
group. Regarding the intuition of the result, straightforward and not surprising is the case in
which there is a majority within the middle income group i.e., Fy2 − Fy1 ≥ 1/2; hence,
the middle class can aﬀord to minimize its tax, and the burden remains on the rich and the
poor.
Not intuitively straightforward is the case in which the middle income group cannot
form a majority coalition, but there exists a majority formed by individuals between the upper
part of the low income group and the lower part of the high income group i.e., Fy2/y −
Fμy − y2/μ − y ≥ 1/2 > Fy2 − Fy1. The policy preferred by the middle income
group remains the only majority winner because there is disagreement within the low income
group, between the upper part and the rest of the group, and within the high income group,
between the lower part and the rest, respectively. Although the second part of the proposition
implies a left skewed distribution of the income not existent in practice, the result is in the
same line with the first and third parts: as far as the median voter prefers the tax A1 together
with all the individuals in the subclass to which the median voter belongs, then the majority
winner must consist of that policy.
The next proposition characterizes the class of income distributions for which the
model does not provide a Condorcet winner.
Proposition 3.6. Let F be such that Fy2/y − Fμy − y2/μ − y < 1/2.
1 Let y1 < ym < y2/y. If there is α0 ∈ y2/2y2, μ2 − y2/2yμ − y such that
Fx2α0 − Fx1α0 < 1/2, then for each 0 < R < y there is no majority winner
(Condorcet winner).
2 If R  0, y1 < ym < y2 and F satisfies the previous conditions (in Proposition 3.6(1)), then
there is no majority winner (Condorcet winner).
Proof of Proposition 3.6. In order to prove the result, it is suﬃcient for each tax policy t  a, b
to find another tax policy t that is an objection to the tax t, that is, ν{x ∈ 0, μ : t − tx <
0} > 1/2. Let t  a, b be a given tax policy. In our attempt to determine an objection to the
tax policy t, we are looking for a pair a, b such that α0  −b − b/2a − ay, a − a < 0 and
b−b > 0. If we denote by   b−b > 0, then b  b	 and a  a−/2αy0. Since the tax policy
defined by a, b must satisfy the feasibility conditions FA, we have to choose  > 0 such
that 0 ≤ b 	  ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 2aμ 	 b 	 1 − μ/y/α0 ≤ 1, ay2 	 by 	 y1 − y2/2y2/α0 ≥ R.
Due to the fact that α0 ∈ y2/2y2, μ2 − y2/2yμ − y ⊂ y2/2y2, μ/y, we have the
following inequalities: 1 − μ/y/α0 < 0 and 1 − y2/2y2/α0 > 0. So, only if b < 1 and
2aμ 	 b > 0, there exists  > 0 such that the previous conditions are satisfied. Since α0 ∈
y2/2y
2, μ2 − y2/2yμ − y, by applying Lemma 3.1, we obtain: ν{x : t − tx <
0}  ν0, x1α0 ∪ x2α0, 1  1 − Fx2α0 − Fx1α0 > 1/2 and in conclusion t is an
objection for t.
It remains to analyze the cases b  1 and 2aμ 	 b  0. Let t be a tax policy defined
by a, 1. In order to determine an objection t  a, b, we look for values a, b which satisfy
the feasibility conditions FA and −b − b/2a − ay  μ/y. Since b  1, then b − b < 0
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and in consequence a − a > 0. If we denote a − a   > 0, then a  a 	  and b  1 − 2μ.
After short computations, we observe that we must determine  > 0 such that  ≤ 1/2μ
and  ≤ y 	 ay2 − R/−y2 	 2μy. In the case when y 	 ay2 − R > 0, then we can choose
 > 0 which satisfies the previous restrictions. The policy tax t is an objection to t due to the
fact that ν{x ∈ 0, μ : t − tx < 0}  νy1, μ  1 − Fy1 > 1 − Fym  1/2. In the case
when y 	 ay2 − R  0, then the objection tax policy can be determined in a similar manner
by choosing a, b such that −b − b/2a − ay  y2/2y2. In the case when 2aμ 	 b  0,
the objection function t can be also obtained by choosing a and b which satisfy the feasibility
conditions and the equality −b − b/2a − ay  y2/2y2. If we denote a − a  , then
a  a 	  and b  b − y2/y. After short computations, we observe that we must determine
 > 0 such that  ≤ by/y2 and  ≤ y/2μy − y2. In the case when b > 0, then we can choose
 > 0 which satisfies the previous restrictions and we get ν{x : t − tx < 0}  ν0, x2α 
ν0, y2/y  Fy2/y > Fym  1/2. Hence, t is an objection to the tax policy t. If b  0, then
a  0 and in consequence R  0. For R  0, we have to study the case y1 < ym < y2. In this
case the tax policy t given by 1/2μ, 0 is an objection to t. This completes the proof.
The next proposition specifies what are the conditions for a majority winner to exist
and such that the conclusions of Proposition 3.4 remain valid, even if there cannot be formed
a majority by individuals between the upper part of the low income group and the lower part
of the high income group.
Proposition 3.7. Let y1 < ym < y2/y and Fy2/y − Fμy − y2/μ − y < 1/2. If for each
α ∈ y2/2y2, μ2 −y2/2yμ−y we have Fx2α−Fx1α ≥ 1/2, then the conclusions of
the Proposition 3.4 are true.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Similar to the proof of the Proposition 3.4.
The intuition of this proposition is not straightforward and resides in the same type
of arguments invoked by De Donder and Hindriks 3. The maximum progressivity has
majority support due to the disagreement, not only between the lower and upper parts of
the high income group, but also among the individuals of the upper part of this income class.
Analogous analysis can be performed for the low income class.
To be more specific, for any tax change represented by the parameter α involving
less progressivity parameter a and higher flat tax parameter b, there is always some poor
with income higher than x1α who do not find the increase in b large enough to compensate
for the lower a. As well, there is always some rich with income lower than x2α who do
not find the decrease in a large enough to compensate for the increase in b. The group in
disagreement with the extremes for a given tax change is larger now than in Proposition 3.4,
that is, μy−y2/μ−y, y2/y ⊂ x1α, x2α, for all α ∈ y2/2y2, μ2−y2/2yμ−y.
Therefore the condition on the distribution of income in Proposition 3.7 ensures that the size
of the group x1α, x2α is large enough to form a majority, for any possible α.
4. Conclusions
We identified what are the most preferred taxes of the individuals and the corresponding
income groups they can be classified in, based on the preferred policies, for every case of
taxation that has more than a purely redistributive purpose meaning that the tax should
collect some positive amount R > 0. In particular, we have proved that if the model
14 Journal of Inequalities and Applications
departs from the purely redistributive feature, then, at least within the high income class,
the preferences diﬀer between the groups y2, y2/y and y2/y, μ. This fact is essential to
understand the result which states that the suﬃcient condition of De Donder and Hindriks
3 can be relaxed to a broader one.
Indeed, for not very large collected amounts R, it is enough to have a majority formed
by individuals between the upper part of the low income group and the lower part of the
high income group, in order to insure support for the highest tax progressivity as far as the
median voter prefers this policy, that is, y1 < ym < y2. For R  0, the results in De Donder
and Hindriks 3 were obtained around the more restrictive condition Fy2 − Fy1 ≥ 1/2.
However, the case of purely redistributive taxations can be seen as a limiting case of those
situations in which the taxes should collect some positive amounts. Therefore, for R  0 and
for every distribution function F such that Fy2/y − Fμy − y2/μ − y ≥ 1/2 > Fy2 −
Fy1, it is also certain that the maximum progressivity is the voting outcome. Example 3.5
shows that the set of the distribution functions with the above property is not empty.
For reasons of completeness, the paper provides an overall description of those income
distribution functions for which a majority winning tax exists or does not exist, when the
quadratic taxation model is not purely redistributive. For the same reasons of completeness,
the analysis considers both the right skewed income distributions, which are predominant
in practice, but also the left skewed ones are analyzed see the second and third parts of
Proposition 3.3, and the second part of Proposition 3.4. We conclude with the idea that,
should any political equilibrium diﬀerent than the Condorcet winner be proposed, it is
important to be first tested on those quadratic taxation models without majority winners
both for purely, as well as for nonpurely redistributive taxations. Our work oﬀers a
complete mathematical description of this testing set of models.
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